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Curiously, the behaviour of parties in elections has attracted more 
attention over the past three decades than the behaviour of parties in 
government - at least on a systematic and comparative basis. Yet there 
can be no argument over the equal if not greater importance of govern­
mental processes for our understanding of politics. No matter how free, 
representative and responsible elections may be, any failure to respond 
at government level renders them totally ineffective.
Parties alone operate in elections as well as in government. They 
are consequently in a unique position to channel broad popular preferences 
into Government action. Studying the way parties do this is just as 
essential as the analysis of their electoral strategies for an under­
standing of democratic processes.
This in turn is vital to the justification of democracy against 
other types of political system. Without valid knowledge of how govern­
ments are formed and run by parties, we cannot argue with any conviction 
for the general superiority of the democratic system. We are simply 
basing assertions on ignorance of its central processes.
Nor is it enough to review the workings of party governments in 
one or two sophisticated Western politics. For this, quite fairly, 
provokes the criticism that democratic parties may govern efficiently and 
sensitively under favourable conditions, but where they face the social 
and political traumas of the rest of the world will prove just as 
unresponsive and ineffective as any other type of ruler. To demonstrate 
that democracy does live up to its claims, one must study the behaviour 





























































































This book reviews party governments in twenty-one democracies, in 
the underdeveloped as well as the developed countries of the world, 
operating under a variety of cultural and societal conditions. These 
countries are chosen as having maintained a democratic system for most 
of the post-war period. Countries which became independent or demo­
cratic later are excluded because their party systems and modes of 
government have in most cases not yet stabilised, and cannot be used as 
a basis for broad comparative and temporal generalisations. This still 
permits the inclusion of India and Sri Lanka in the analysis, together 
with Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, outside the core demo­
cracies of Western Europe. As the object is to study countries with 
broadly similar government arrangements (although operating under a 
variety of cultural, social and economic circumstances), the United 
States and Switzerland are also excluded. The Presidential government 
of the United States, where the electorally successful party takes 
executive powers unconditionally and with a constitutionally guaranteed 
term of office, differs sharply from the systems operated in the 
countries chosen for study, where government's tenure of office depends 
upon its ability to win votes of confidence in the legislature. Simi­
larly, none of the other countries has experienced the radical devolution 
of power to the cantons made in Switzerland and the consequent relegation 
of national government to a caretaker role which facilitates permanent 
coalitions between the main parties.
The criteria of selection nevertheless allow for inclusion of all 
the other major democracies of the world and thus for the testing of a 
comprehensive theory of democratic party government. The concern to 
develop such a theory stems from three considerations. The first is a 
desire to round off previous work with Dennis Farlie, on the behaviour 




























































































outcomes (Budge, Crewe and Farlie (eds.), 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1977; 
Budge and Farlie, 1983). In Explaining and Predicting Elections (1983) 
a systematic theory of election outcomes was developed and validated 
for twenty-three democracies - the ones studied here with the United 
States and Switzerland. Explaining the behaviour of parties in govern­
ment is a natural corollary to explaining how they gain the popular sup­
port necessary to sustain a governmental role. Together, the theories 
of elections and governments constitute an overall explanation of the 
central democratic process^,
Work on the theory of government actually began as part of the 
project on the Future of Party Government, directed from 1981 by Rudolph 
Wildenmann at the European University Institute in Florence. Analyses 
of the ways party roles in government will develop in the future, and 
indeed descriptions of the way it functions at present, all require a 
comprehensive theory of what parties do in government. This provides 
general reference points for detailed analyses of particular processes.
In turn, these detailed analyses contribute to the development of an 
overall theory. So there is a symbiotic relationship between the broad 
comparative analysis discussed here, and the country and process-specific 
analyses produced by the project (series references to books from party 
project).
■Ht£Not only did theory and book gain intellectually from^wide-ranging 
seminars organised under the Party Government Programme, but they also 
gained necessary material support, in the shape of research assistance, 
photocopying and travel costs-without which the large amount of informa­
tion needed to validate the theory would not have been assembled and 
processed. At an early stage the Nuffield Foundation also contributed 
to these costs in its usual enlightened and timely fashion (Grant No. 




























































































essential help prevents them from disclaiming all responsibility for 
what follows! In particular I should like to thank Rudolph Wildenmann, 
Val Herman, Norman Schofield, Dick Katz,
While the book has incorporated many of the criticisms and suggestions 
resulting from discussion with them, I am solely responsible for errors 
of execution and presentation.
The third impulse to generate a systematic theory of democratic 
party government stems from the desire to develop and unify work already 
done by others. While the comparative analysis of democratic govern­
ments has been neglected it has not been totally ignored. In particular, 
attempts have been made to create a theory of the way parties enter into 
coalitions, and distribute ministries, and to test this comparatively, 
within the context of an office-seeking model of party behaviour.
It will be obvious that the theory developed here (as any theory in 
the field must, in my opinion) starts from an evaluation of the strengths 
and weaknesses of such office-seeking models. While these vary in 
detail, their basic assumption is that democratic parties aim above all 
at acquiring and keeping government office. More detailed implications 
are then derived from this and used to explain actual party behaviour.
Such models have had two enduring effects on subsequent research.
One is to ensure that politicians' strategies and decisions are viewed 
as broadly rational and hence explicable in fairly simple terms. The 
theory stated in Chapter 1 stands like the office-seeking explanations 
within the broad 'rational choice' tradition, even if it attributes more 
substantive preferences to party politicians thanyjabstract maximisation 
hypotheses derived from economics.
The second influence from the 'office-seeking' models is apparent 




























































































theory. After initial assumptions have been stated, their implications 
are drawn out before being checked against actual party behaviour to 
see if they hold. Such a priori theory is useful because it must fill 
in all the links in its chain of reasoning, and is thus more specific and 
detailed about all the assumptions involved than most retrospective 
interpretations of pre-existing data. A fully articulated statement is 
not only more satisfactory in itself but provides a better basis for 
prediction of future behaviour. Although prediction is not the same as 
explanation, it is both of practical use - particularly in directing 
attention to what is going to happen in such a vital institution as 
government - and important in selecting the best theoretical explanation. 
The systematic and predictive form of the theory also has the advantage 
of dovetailing with the predictive theory of election outcomes already 
developed (Budge and Farlie, 1983).
Not that inductive, data-based work has been ignored. This book is 
from one point of view an attempt to synthesise these empirical findings 
within the framework of rational choice theory. Overwhelmingly, 
detailed research has shown that party leaders' policy preferences cannot 
be ignored in any realistic explanation of government processes. Such 
preferences not only limit what politicians will do and say to get 
elected (Robertson, 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1977, ch.ll). They also make 
it unsatisfactory for them to govern without giving precedence to 
ideological predispositions and policy commitments (Budge and Farlie,
1977, pp.157-162; Railings, 1984). These markedly affect, for example, 
different governments' expenditure decisions (Castles (ed.), 1982). 
Subsequent discussion not only incorporates the research-attested primacy 
of policy as a basic assumption, but uses some of the previous findings 
to decide between competing theories (Chapter 4 below).




























































































Chapter 1 discusses previous theory and research^and criticisms and 
developments which lead to the new deductive theory. This is summarised 
in the verbal propositions of Tables 1.1 to 1.3, with the supporting 
text. Together these constitute a systematic, comparative, comprehensive 
theory of government formation; initial distribution and re-allocation of 
ministries; policy-making and outputs; and decease. Chapters 2-5 each 
start by drawing out implications of the unified theory for their own 
area, and then report the fit between these implications and the actual 
record of post-war governments in the twenty-one countries. Chapter 2 
is concerned with government formation; Chapter 3 with the initial dis­
tribution of ministries between parties; Chapter 4 reviews policies and 
expenditures; and Chapter 5 deals with reshuffles (often involving 
internal party factions) and the collapse of governments. Chapter 6 
assesses the bearings of the empirical findings on general theory.
It will be obvious from the outline that the theory here, unlike 
its predecessors, covers all the major preoccupations of parties in 
government, treating the actual formation of governments as part of their 
overall life-process rather than as the major problem requiring explanation.
This seems necessary if the explanation is to provide a context for 
general research into problems of party government. For historians, 
and institutional and policy analysts, the actual formation of a govern­
ment is less significant than what it does during its lifetime. Concen­
tration on the emergence of particular types of government is perhaps 
natural in theories that have emphasised the predominant concern of 
parties with gaining and keeping office. For other research it is only 
a starting point.
Besides explaining the processes internal to government formation, 




























































































satisfactory theory should also relate them through a concise set of 
general assumptions linking what would be otherwise rece-awie^ as disparate 
areas of activity. If the assumptions can be shown to fit actual obser­
vations, either directly or through their implications, they can be 
taken as basic principles underlying the whole operation of democratic 
party governments. Tables 1.1 to 1.3 of Chapter 1 attempt to present 
such general assumptions succinctly in the shape of verbal propositions 
which can be precisely discussed and whose relevance to the various 
implications and applications checked in later chapters can be made very 
clear. The presentation and discussion of these assumptions, and of 






























































































PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT - A NEW THEORY
1. Previous Explanations: The Primacy of Office and the Introduction 
of Policy Considerations
Before a new theory can be developed, careful attention must be 
paid to the old. It is rare in political science to have a body of 
well-developed earlier theory. So some justification must be given of 
the need to modify it. Moreover the new theory, like any other system­
atic explanation of the behaviour of democratic governments, must 
define its position in regard to the ideas about 'rational choice', 
borrowed from economics, which have dominated studies of politicians' 
behaviour over the past twenty-five years. Because variants of such 
ideas constitute the only general theories of democratic government at 
the present time, it is essential to come to terms with them before
This does not mean that substantive research findings made indepen­
dently of this framework should be ignored. These in fact constitute one 
of the main reasons for modifying current models and will be introduced 
into discussion at the appropriate moment. But discussion must begin 
at the theoretical level.
Office-seeking assumptions are not the only ones which might be 
postulated within the framework of 'rational choice'. Rational choice 
in a broad sense is simply adoption of the most cost-efficient course of 
action to achieve desired ends. Rationality relates to the pursuit of 
given ends and cannot of itself impose restrictions on the type of end 
endorsed (Budge, Farlie and Laver, 1982).




























































































is so essential to gaining material ends) that maximising profits and 
minimising costs can be taken as a universal immediate objective for 
everyone in the market. By analogy, most extant models of party 
behaviour in government assume that possession of office is so essential 
to achieving all other party goals, including 'altruistic' or ideologically 
motivated enactment of their policies, that office becomes their universal 
immediate objective. Parties are therefore seen as trying to hold as 
many Government ministries as they can for as long a period as possible 
at least cost^ in terms of effort expended.
While the essence of money is that, once gained, it can be freely 
spent, office is usually held only on certain conditions. So the analogy 
is not perfect. What happens where the conditions of holding office 
preclude the achievement of preferred policy ends is not usually dis­
cussed in office-holding models. One analysis indicates that under such 
circumstances, negative utilities might emerge rather quickly (Budge and 
Farlie, 1977, pp.157-162).
This is simply commonsense. It is hard to imagine any politician 
in the real world agreeing to enact policies he opposes simply to stay 
in office. There are prudential as well as moral reasons for this.
Even in a world of selfish utility-maximisers a reputation for respon­
sibility and reliability is worth votes (Downs ( 1 9 5 7 ( pp.103-9). Yet 
if politicians seek office as their immediate overriding objective, 
they will adopt just such a course. Office is justified as essential to 
the attainment of other ends, but rather quickly replaces these within 
the strict office-seeking models (partly because other ends are vague 
and unspecified), no the nlfimnfr— and—orriy—goajL
The basic assumption behind office-seeking developments of 




























































































factions within parties) are united groups aiming at a maximal share
of the spoils of office. They must therefore form a coalition which
commands over 50 per cent of legislative seats (otherwise their equally
selfish opponents would combine to vote down the government), but not
much over 50 per cent, otherwise they would have to share their spoils
more widely than would otherwise be required (Riker, 1962; Gamson, 1961).
Although it applies mainly to coalition formation in a multi-party
situation, and not to other government processes, this theory is general
and comparative. It meshes conveniently with models of voting behaviour
where parties are similarly assumed to be selfish office-seekers,
adjusting policies to get votes (Downs, 1957; for a review see Budge and
office-seeking models
Farlie, 1977, chs.3-5). Combined, the two/form a comprehensive and 
unified explanation of democratic processes (including government 
policy-making, which would in this case be directed to aggrandisement 
of party interests and attracting further votes). If one party has a 
majority in government the situation from the point of view of office- 
seekers is even better, as they do not need to share their spoils with 
anyone outside the party.
Various extensions have been proposed to this basic position. Some 
of these have been along the lines of refining previous requirements, 
so that not only a minimal number of legislators but also of parties 
share the spoils. (For a review of such principles see Taylor, 1972.) 
None of these modifications, however, noticeably improves the fit of 
the original model to actual patterns of coalition formation in Western 
Europe (Taylor and Laver, 1973; Herman and Pope, 1973; Laver, 1974).
The most important extension to the original assumptions has been 
to introduce ideology into the rational choice framework, although more 
as an externally imposed constraint on the coalitions office-seekers can 




























































































other words, is that given the existence of ideology it makes sense even 
for those not ideologically motivated themselves to combine with the 
closer parties rather than those further away. The reasons stem from 
the tensions and disagreements which ideological disparities would 
introduce. These produce higher costs - time and energy spent in internal 
government negotiations - which in turn diminish the net profit to be 
made out of office-holding. Moreover internal disagreements also 
render the fall of the government more likely.
For both reasons policy disagreements are viewed even on office-
#
seeking assumptions as needing to be minimised either by ensuring that 
ideologically contiguous parties form the government (a minimal connec­
ted winning coalition (Axelrod, 1970)) or that overall diversity is 
reduced, even although this may sometimes involve 'jumping' small 
neighbouring parties (Leiderson, 1966; De Swaan, 197J). Such considera­
tions are then assumed to enter increasingly into politicians' calcula­
tions, along with their desire to attain and keep office with the 
smallest group possible (again, of course, a majority party is ideal 
from this point of view). (For a review of the ways in which these 
criteria interrelate see Taylor, 1972.)
Such pec extension$to the original minimal winning criteria can be 
criticised. If ideology is so important a constraint, why should it, 
rather than office-seeking, not dominate the actions of politicians? 
Attainment of office is often postulated as a primary goal because it 
is the prerequisite to putting policy into practice. If, on the other 
hand, the attraction of ideology is great, its binding power in a 
coalition would surely substitute for common pursuit of gains from 
office, thus making for less concern with a minimalist criterion, as 
Browne and Rice (1979) and Grofman (1980) imply. Since ideological 




























































































there would also be more prospects of external support (and internal 
disintegration) than the pure office-seeking theory allows.
Ideological sympathies and alliances fluctuate, as different aspects 
of policy assume prominence. However, both the original, pure office­
seeking theories, and their ideological modifications, are static.
They assume that the same factors influence politicians all the time.
To some extent of course any general theory which tries to cover events 
in a number of countries over a considerable time period must provide 
an invariant framework to work within. But there are degrees of 
invariance, and it seems unlikely that politicians would always react in 
the same way to the wildly fluctuating vagaries of domestic and inter­
national politics, nor that ideological distances or policy agreements 
always remain the same. It would be desirable to have a theory which 
made some allowance for changing historical circumstances and politicians' 
reactions to them (Laver, 1974).
A deliberately simplified formal theory cannot, however, be ade­
quately criticised on the grounds that politicians do not consciously 
apply it. They may, after all, act in the way it describes even if, 
for prudential or electoral reasons, they do not admit this or even 
are themselves not aware of doing so. The proof then rests on the extent 
to which actual coalitions form in ways specified in the theory. Unfor­
tunately, when we look at the evidence, only 34 per cent of coalitions 
in twelve Western European countries between 1945 and 1971 are covered 
by the optimal combination of minimal winning and ideological distance 
criteria (Herman and Pope, 1973). An additional 30.2 per cent were 
formed by surplus majority governments, i.e. by a coalition of more than 
enough parties to form a minimum winning group. And another 35.8 per 
cent were composed of coalitions with less than 50 per cent of legisla­





























































































These conclusions hold when Governments are defined as administra­
tions formed after a general election and continuing in the absence of:-
(a) change in the prime minister;
(b) change in the party composition of the cabinet;
(c) resignation in an inter-election period followed by reformation 
of the government with the same prime minister and party compo­
sition (Hurwitz, 1971; Sanders and Herman, 1977).
This is a standard definition and it is the one adopted throughout 
this discussion. Normally we do think of such events as defining a 
government's period of office, and it brings our theories closer to 
practice when we use the commonsense definition. In a study which omits 
the criteria of elections and resignations, and thus assimilates govern­
ments with the same prime minister and party composition, Laurence Dodd 
(1976) does establish a tendency for governments formed on minimal 
winning principles to last longer. The difficulty is to sort out the 
implications of this when, for example, the 1949 Menzies Government in 
Australia lasted by this criteria for seventeen years! There are, after 
all, reasons why governments resign, even if they reform later along the 
same lines. It is likely, after this crisis, that power relationships 
and/or policy priorities have changed, so it makes sense to distinguish 
the two.
Recent work by Schofield (1983, chs. 2 and 3) using the same defi­
nition of government change as Dodd, has confirmed the tendency for 
minimal winning coalitions to last longer. It further appears that 
minimal winning coalitions tend to form as expected where there are a 
reasonably small number of significant parties. As fragmentation




























































































surplus coalitions alternate in increasing numbers with minority govern- 
ments. This could be interpreted as a reaction toiconfusion and uncer­
tainty inherent in dealing with too many independent actors, and con­
sequent difficulties of calculation. In turn the strain of making con­
stant concessions and compromises seems to provoke internal splits and 
disagreements within the existing parties, thus increasing fragmentation 
in a continuing vicious circle.
These findings indicate that in certain circumstances the office­
seeking, minimal-winning criteria are relevant. However, the criteria 
are not universally applicable and indeed may apply only under rather 
specific circumstances. This point is reinforced by the findings of 
Taylor and Laver (1973) and Herman and Pope (1973) using the generally 
accepted definition of government given above, that roughly a third of 
West European government coalitions did conform to minimum winning 
criteria (tempered, however, by considerations of policy distance). The 
new formulation outlined below is compatible with these findings in 
allowing for the application of minimal winning office-seeking considera­
tions where policy agreement is lacking (see Table 2.1 below).
Because minimal winning criteria apply only patchily, steps have 
been taken to formulate rational choice criteria for coalition formation, 
based on policy distance of some kind which almost, or even wholly, 
exclude office-seeking from consideration (De Swaan, 1973, p.156; Browne 
and Rice, 1979; Grofman, 1980). Such formulations may quite happily 
predict the formation of surplus coalitions where the parties are 
ideologically contiguous. They have not yet been tested against a wide 
range of systematically collected evidence. But the fact that large 
numbers of surplus majority governments are known to form, attests to 
their realism in this respect. This shift from office-seeking to pure




























































































to give explicit precedence to policy, as in the general theory of 
government below (Section 2).
The evaluation of office-seeking theory has concentrated on the 
emergence of government coalitions because it is here that it is most 
explicit and widely applied. Evidence on the allocation of ministries 
is ambiguous. Browne and Franklin (1973) related the share of ministries 
received by parties to their share of seats, and noted a strong propor­
tionality between them. Parties, in other words, received an allocation 
of ministries proportional to the share of seats they had contributed to 
support the government. While this might seem to fit a straightforward 
office-seeking interpretation, maximisers of office among smaller parties 
crucial to the formation of government would surely demand a dispropor- 
tionate share of ministries (cf. Olson, 1966, pp. ). Since in 
absolute terms this would still be worthwhile for larger parties to con­
cede (for relatively few offices are involved relative to those which 
can be gained), one would expect on strict office-maximising assumptions
to find strong disproportionality in favour of small parties. Some
*
tendencies in this direction are noted by Browne and Franklin, but not 
to the extent that would be envisaged by the theory.
Strictly speaking, office-maximisation has been applied only to 
coalition formation and to some extent to the allocation of ministries, 
rather than to other aspects of government activity. As noted above, 
its close relationship to the office-seeking theory of party competition 
nevertheless implies that politicians will try to carry through policies 
supported by the majority of electors, since that is what will ultimately 
secure victory and office. Since this is the only consideration in their 
minds, past commitments or longstanding ideological attachments will 
carry no weight compared to current majority preferences (cf. Budge and




























































































On the other hand, the postulate of rapid policy adjustments of 
this kind contradicts the insertion into office-seeking coalition models 
of fixed ideological positions which render co-operation between neigh­
bours more profitable than co-operation across greater ideological dis­
tances. If positions are constantly being adjusted to meet electoral 
preferences, fixed ideological positions will not exist, even for limited 
periods of time. Calculating transitory proximities will rapidly become 
unmanageable.
Thus the promised integration of the two branches of office-seeking 
theories, which in the abstract forms an attractive explanation of most 
electoral and governmental processes, actually conceals an important 
anomaly in regard to the extent and speed of policy adjustments. Either 
the office-seeking coalition theory has to drop assumptions about stable 
ideological positions for the parties, which would diminish its fit to 
existing evidence, or office-seeking theories of electoral competition 
have to modify their assumption that parties are infinitely flexible in 
policy terms.
•
In point of fact parties do seem to have stable policy commitments, 
to which in some cases they subordinate office but which in any case are 
bound up with their political aspirations. Because of the impossibility 
of making fine adjustments and calculations, electors vote on the basis 
of fixed associations between the parties and certain broad policies 
(Robertson, 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1983, ch.2). Certainly party strate­
gists act on this assumption (Budge and Robertson, 1984). So parties 
have no hopes of evading the connection. If they do not carry through 
their characteristic policies while in government, they will not profit 
by their neglect (quite the reverse in some cases).




























































































ideological positions for the parties, which has been incorporated in 
some form into most office-seeking models. But it goes further in 
pointing to the dominance of policy considerations over a strategy of 
immediate office-seeking. Alterations to the original models have 
themselves mostly followed this direction, to the extent that policy 
considerations have replaced office-seeking altg^ether, as noted above.
Given the poor overall fit between office-seeking models and the 
actual behaviour of parties in government, the obvious way to build a 
new and more satisfactory theory is to turn the original formulation on 
its head, and give primacy to policy considerations. Instead of 
assuming politicians to aim at personal aggrandisement, we postulate 
that they put preferred policies above office. Participation in govern­
ment is valued because it gives parties an opportunity to implement 
policy. Such an assumption links up party behaviour in government to 
what has been shown to happen in elections (Budge and Farlie, 1983).
It also extends the motives behind the formation of government (Chapter 
2) to those determining the distribution of Ministries (Chapter 3), to 
the principles of government policy making (Chapter 4) and to the purpose 
behind Ministerial reshuffles (Chapter 5). Although this theory of 
democratic government breaks with earlier theory on the primacy of 
policy over office, the break is not complete. The hierarchical prin­
ciples postulated to underlie government formation leave a place for 
minimal winning coalitions in multi-party systems without policy agree­
ment (Table 1.2). Prime Ministers who push preferred policies act 
indistinguishably from Prime Ministers who wish to keep themselves in 
office (Table 1.3). Formally, of course, the statement of theory is 
inspired by the shape of the earlier explanations. More broadly,, the 
pursuit of policy seems quite as 'rational' as the pursuit of office, 
besides giving a more attractive picture of the democratic politician 




























































































2. A Comprehensive Theory of Democratic Party Government giving
Primacy to Policy Preferences
i. Assumptions
This section systematically develops the consequences of the 
critique in Section 1 and the tendency of office-seeking models them­
selves to incorporate ideology and policy. If policy preferences are 
taken as the major determinant of politicians' actions, one must specify 
what these are and how they affect behaviour within Governments. As 
will be seen, this still leaves a place for the minimal winning coali­
tion, but as a last resort rather than as the general norm. As well as 
the shape taken by policy preferences, it must detail the circumstances 
under which a government can actually form (does it require a minimum of 
50 per cent plus one seats in the legislature as the office-seeking 
argument implies? Or can it make do with less now the assumption of 
pure office-seeking has been modified?). Parties are not necessarily 
united internally, of course, although their endorsement of a large 
number of common interests renders it natural for many purposes to view 
them as single actors. This is entirely defensible for purposes of 
simplification, when (for example in the formation of governments) most 
parties have clearly defined purposes and positions on which most of 
their members at least temporarily agree. In dealing with the func­
tioning of governments over a one to four year period, however, internal 
party factions emerge, even if they were not there before (but they 
normally are). Their existence affects the policies governments make, 
and perhaps even more closely the re-allocation of ministries and 
reshuffles which occur during the lifetime of most governments.
Table 1.1 spells out the general assumptions of a new theory designed




























































































explaining all the major aspects of party behaviour in government.
(Table 1.1 about here)
The assumptions are stated verbally, as, precisely and clearly as 
possible. The advantage of presenting them together in a table is to 
render them more easily memorable and to emphasise their interrelation­
ships. A tabular presentation serves also to highlight any ambiguities 
or unforeseen complexities, which the object is to eliminate. In the 
table the assumptions form a progression from those necessary to cover 
the question of government formation to those dealing with other aspects 
of government (though most assumptions have implications for more than 
one area, as will appear).
Although it might be regarded as purely definitional in nature, 
Assumption 1 does specify the minimal condition for a government's 
existence - the state of affairs which parties must aim to create if they 
wish to form a government and which they must maintain if they want to 
stay in office. At first sight it may seem obvious (in the Parliamentary 
regimes being discussed) that governments need a majority in legislative 
votes of confidence. The ability of the government to gain legislative 
support is, after all, specified in most constitutions (written or 
unwritten) as a legal requirement for its survival.
Note, however, what this very bare assumption is not saying - that 
is its real significance in our argument. It does not maintain as an 
office-seeking approach does, that the Government must have a majority 
of seats in the Chamber in order to win votes of confidence, on the 
further assumption that all non-government parties impelled by the urge 
for immediate office will gang up on the Government at every opportunity. 
Since office-seeking has been abandoned as the primary motivation, there 




























































































government from outside, or at least abstain, if they have policy aims 
which may be served by these courses of action. Moreover, two non­
government parties, even if they dislike the government and wish to 
replace it by themselves, may still like that alternative better than its 
replacement by the other. Hence they will rarely vote simultaneously 
against it. For all these reasons a government may survive quite com­
fortably for a considerable period with less than 50 per cent of legis­
lative seats - indeed, quite often with less than 40 per cent. Thus 
Assumption 1 is quite compatible with the observed frequency of minority 
governments - which are almost as common as minimal winning coalitions.
With the question of what is at stake clarified, Assumption 2 states 
explicitly the point that has been made generally above - that parties' 
main concern is with setting up governments which will carry through 
their preferred policies, rather than simply being in government for its 
own sake.
Assumption 3 states explicitly what parties' preferred policies are. 
In order of priority these are to conserve democracy, if that is in any 
sense under threat; where such a threat is absent to deal with distri­
butional and planning matters related to Socialist policies (whether 
the parties concerned are for or against them); and where these are not 
salient, to pursue their own characteristic policies (which are most 
often designed to benefit the social groups from which the party draws 
its support).
In making such explicit assumptions about parties' and politicians' 
preferences, the new approach breaks decisively with earlier ones.
Under the desire to preserve generality wherever possible, most formal 
models seek to make their assumptions and implications compatible with 




























































































necessary to postulate certain goals for actors in order to give the 
formal reasoning some application and content, this usually involves 
a narrowing down of postulated goals to pure office-seeking, on the 
ground that attainment of office is prerequisite to pursuing any policy. 
While this reasoning has a surface plausibility it is obvious that it 
breaks down in the many cases where the price of entry to office is the 
abandonment or even drastic modification of preferred policy.
Politicians, on the contrary, usually seem to have certain specific 
policies in mind when they set up or enter governments. These policies 
vary with circumstances. Politicians, like anyone else, tend to switch 
their priorities in response to changed situations. The wording of 
Assumption 3 allows for this. Thus in a crisis of the regime, it is 
highly unlikely that the very politicians who have been most influential 
in shaping its practices, and who in many ways are the chief beneficiaries 
of existing arrangements, will not make their main concern its support 
and defence. Such politicians will, by definition, be in the majority 
since if they were not, the democratic regime would already have ceased 
to exist! Whatever their previous differences over social and economic 
policy, or in regard to the various group interests they represent, they 
will come together when the system of bargaining whereby these differences 
is settled is itself attacked. In that, they have a common interest 
overlying the disputes they carry on within the bargaining process.
In a normal political situation, democracy is not seriously 
threatened. This gives free play for such 'ordinary' disputes to emerge. 
The most pervasive and general of these relate to the programmes of 
Socialist parties or related 'progressive' parties (Budge and Robertson 
(eds.), 1984, ch.20). Whether or not these are full-blooded Marxist or 
simply reformist in intent, they all threaten upsets in established 




























































































result, all parties will tend to line up on either the Socialist or 
anti-Socialist side when these issues come to the fore, sinking the 
differences which at other times might have separated them. Under such 
circumstances they will be willing to refrain from pushing points to 
which at other times they should have been firmly wedded, since their 
clients would, in their view, be more decisively affected by the success 
or reversal of the Socialist programme where there seems a real possi­
bility of it being effected.
Where this is unlikely, and no threat to the democratic system 
exists, then parties and politicians are free to pursue the policies 
most characteristically associated with them. As we have noted, these 
are often interests or needs of supporting or associated groups.
Socialist parties will follow this course too, but in a more incremental 
and piecemeal fashion than in periods of outright confrontation with 
bourgeois parties.
Assumption 3 is, of course, specifically phrased so as to cover the 
post-war situation in the democracies covered here. It is probable that 
the same specification would apply pre-war, although its applicability 
to that period will not be checked here. Although the assumption does 
tie democratic politicians down to a set of substantive preferences, 
it is hard to see what other motives could be operating in their situation, 
whether in the post-war period or at another time. So the loss of 
generality may be more inhibiting for mathematical manipulation than 
for substantive explanation.
Assumption 4 might almost be termed the principle of inertia 
operating within our framework. Parties are concerned with setting up 
the government arrangements which will most effectively attain their 




























































































than is required for that purpose is self-defeating, as this might 
provoke all sort of alarms and resistance, thus rendering it harder to 
carry the preferred policy through. This is because overturning 
established arrangements is both a signal that further, more drastic 
changes are to be expected (thus giving opposition more time to rally) 
and anxiety-provoking in itself. In a sense, usual political guarantees 
are being withdrawn. Thus there is a premium - even for parties bent 
on radical change - on associating with themselves some party which has 
often been in government.
This consideration applies mainly, of course, to parties in a 
coalition system, where governments tend to be made up of two or more 
parties. But it is not absent from two-party majority systems, where 
one party constitute^ a government on their own. Normal governments 
then consist of one or the other of the major parties. Where one of 
these parties is being replaced, however (as in Britain the Liberals were 
by Labour in the twenties), it will always be prudent for the newer 
party to associate itself initially in government with one of the older 
parties.
We have commented on the postulate of party unity and common pur­
poses. Assumptions 2 to 4 in fact ascribe common preferences and moti­
vations to parties as such. This is realistic in that any parh^which 
keeps together as a functioning entity must preserve a minimal set of 
common purposes vis-a-vis other parties. Office is rarely enough to 
provide a unifying bond, because as already pointed out the mere 
achievement of office gives little satisfaction if it does not provide a 
means of co-operating with like-minded individuals to effect policies.
If a party is so divided as not to agree internally on some preferred 
policies more than its factions do with groups outside the party, then




























































































Within this set of common purposes there is, however, room for 
differences of emphasis and priority. Within most parties these give 
rise to different groups and factions, which compete to place their own 
adherents within Ministries and to influence Government policy.
Assumption 5 explicitly recognises the existence of such factions and 
groups, but also incorporates the qualifications made above - their 
struggles are contained within the overall party framework. This con­
sists both of shared, overriding, policy agreements and sanctions which 
will be brought to bear upon those who violate these.
Most individuals in a party will belong to a faction, and Ministers 
and Prime Ministers are no exception. Their loyalty to their faction as 
well as to their party will motivate their behaviour, with consequences 
which will be most evident in the area of internal Government change. 
Specifically related to this area is Assumption 7, which makes the perhaps 
trivial but nonetheless essential point that Ministries do not normally 
disappear with Ministers, so the quitting of office by an individual for 
whatever reason provides the stimulus for a change in the composition of 
the Government. We shall follow through the consequences of this in 
relation to Table 1.3 below.
ii. Implications for government formation
Since governments have to be formed before they can be reshuffled, 
we first, however, deal with the implications of our assumptions (speci­
fically Assumptions 1 to 4 in Table 1.1) for the way in which Governments 
are initially constituted. Here we are primarily concerned with which 
parties enter the Government, rather than with the question of how 
Ministries are shared between them. We deal with this later (Section 
2.iv below). As in the case of office-seeking theory, the implications




























































































composition of governments will be under given distributions of 
legislative votes between parties. They are stated in Table 1.2. 
Criteria i, ii(a), iii and iv derive from the first three assumptions 
of Table 1.1 and Criteria ii(b) and v from Assumptions 1 to 4 of that 
table,
(Table 1.2 about here)
The relationship between criteria and assumptions is clear-cut.
If (by Assumption 3(a)) politicians' chief concern when the democratic 
regime is threatened is to defend it, it must follow that all pro-system 
parties will seek the most effective means of doing so. This is to form 
a government of National Unity, far in excess of the bare numbers needed 
to survive votes of confidence (Assumption 1). Only by staging an 
unusual show of unity and determination can threats (whether external 
or internal) be outfaced. Such a 'surplus majority' government is 
inexplicable in terms of pure office-seeking, but it is very under­
standable in terms of a general party agreement on a burningly important 
question of the day - a question, almost, of survival.
The desire to safeguard the regime will also incline democratic 
parties to shun co-operation with parties opposed to it, under any cir­
cumstances. This is not an implication of the assumptions which appears 
as a separate criterion on Table 1.2, but it does appear throughout as 
a constraint on the composition of any coalition government, within the 
other criteria.
Where no threat to the regime is perceived, Criterion ii in 
Table 1.2 states that any party with an absolute majority of legislative 
votes will form a government on its own, or (with an eye to the normal 
arrangements in a country where absolute majorities are unusual) will




























































































'party of government' (i.e. a minor party which almost always partici­
pates in the ruling coalition). Criterion ii(a), on single-party 
government based on an absolute majority of legislative votes, of course 
covers the classic situation produced by competition between two evenly 
balanced major parties. Whether differences over the Socialist pro­
gramme are salient, or in their absence the party is concentrating on 
its own characteristic, group-related policies, single-party government 
will form the easiest way to achieve its preferred goals. The same 
applies, of course, where for prudential reasons a small party has shared 
in government even though this was unnecessary in purely numeric terms.
However, taking democracies as a whole, the emergence of an absolute 
majority for one party is relatively rare. In its absence, a quasi 
two-party system may temporarily be created by a resurgence of Socialis t/ 
non-Socialist divisions. As we have suggested, the repercussions of a 
full-blooded Socialist programme affect most people in the society quite 
strongly. Support or opposition to these forms a cement between parties 
which overrides normal conflict. The salience of the Socialist programme 
thus creates a quasi two-party competition between opposing ideological 
tendencies, in which the opposed coalitions act like majority parties.
In such situations there is no question of some of the parties on one 
side being detached to co-operate in government with the other. Since 
the Socialist/non-Socialist cleavage is central to party competition, 
such an event would be as unthinkable as some faction of a majority 
party joining the opposition. Even anti-system parties excluded from 
actual government participation are driven by ideological imperatives to 
offer support to their own side in this cleavage.
Socialist or non-Socialist loyalties, where these become salient, 
are thus perfectly capable of providing a strong basis of support for 




























































































Their saliency, like the existence of anti-democratic threats, will, 
of course, vary over time. In some countries the prevalence and impor­
tance of division within the Socialist and non-Socialist camps themselves 
may prevent the differences separating them from ever coming to the fore 
of politics. In such cases, and also at times when these divisions are 
muted by other events or the passage of time, other arrangements emerge.
We are talking, it will be remembered, of situations where no party 
has a majority of legislative seats (otherwise, by Criterion ii, it 
would automatically form and dominate a government). However, there 
are a wide variety of intermediate situations between the emergence of 
a single majority party and complete fragmentation into a range of small 
parties. The case considered next is a dominant party system with one 
outstanding party - outstanding either because it has nearly missed a 
majority or because it is obviously larger and more important than any 
other legitimist party. Since a democratic regime is unlikely to continue 
functioning where an anti-system party is largest, this last characteristic 
also implies that it is outstanding in relation to all the other parties.
Such a dominant party is likely to have been repeatedly in govern­
ment in the past, so its claims to office are enhanced by the desira­
bility of preserving normal arrangements. Its size renders it the 
obvious basis for building an administration - a consideration reinforced 
by its ability to bring down most Governments excluding it. Such a party 
can well, with the tolerance of non-government parties, form a viable 
government on its own. Failing tolerance, it may be able to rely on 
divisions between the other parties keeping it in power as the most 
acceptable alternative.
Of course, the position of a dominant party is strengthened if




























































































assures it a directing role in the government anyway, and the continu­
ance of the government is more assured through the adherence of other 
parties.
The absence of a majority party does not, therefore, preclude the 
possibility of government formation on the initiative of the largest 
party. Obviously the position of the government is weaker where it 
commands only a minority of seats, or is subject to the possibility of 
intra-party disputes. But it is not by any means untenable.
The absence of a dominant party serves to convert the situation 
into the classic case of multi-partism, where a considerable number of 
relatively equal parties exist - none being of sufficient weight numeri­
cally to give it an outstanding role. In this case none of the parties 
forms such an obvious basis for the government as to force the other 
parties to negotiate with it. Coalition-building must proceed instead 
by negotiation between equals.
Threats to the regime or Socialist-bourgeois tensions will not pro­
vide a common focus for the negotiations since by definition they do 
not exist in the situation we are discussing (if they did, either a 
surplus-majority government would form under Criterion i , or a quasi­
majority tendance government under Criterion iii ). There is still a 
possibility of attitudinal cement being provided for a Government through 
agreement, however, since in the absence of other concerns each party 
will have its own characteristic policies which it wishes to pursue. If 
potential partners' concerns do not conflict too much on the questions 
which are currently salient to them, a common programme can be hammered 
out as a basis on which to form a government. Such agreement is impor­
tant since it reduces tensions and costs of internal negotiation. It




























































































satisfaction with the existing alliance and averting the possibility 
of the Government foundering amid mutual recriminations.
The negotiation of such a programme is one way of proceeding in 
a fragmented multi-party system. It is entirely possible, however, that 
party preferences conflict so much on salient current issues that no 
genuine agreements can be negotiated. Governments, on the other hand, 
must still be formed. Since the bargaining process cannot be based on 
ideology or policy, the pursuit of office becomes paramount. Here we 
enter the situation postulated by minimal winning theories - but only 
because prior policy-based considerations are, by definition, non-operable. 
In default of policy agreements, it is certainly advisable to keep the 
number of parties in the governing coalition as small as possible, to 
minimise the costs of disagreement and internal negotiations. The size 
will be set, however, not by the need to gain an absolute majority of 
all legislative seats but by the need to group parties with enough sup­
port to win legislative votes of confidence. Policy agreements may be 
absent but enough disagreements can exist among the major non-governmental 
parties to prevent them all lining up against the governing coalition at 
one time. We should consequently expect parties in such a situation to 
form a combination of the least number necessary to attain a consistent 
majority on votes of confidence. (Operationally, as explained in 
Chapter 2, we should know what level of support is necessary for votes 
of confidence by taking the average number of seats Governments have held 
in the past.)
Both the formation of governments by agreement and on the basis of 
a minimum winning combination are constrained by the other factors 
emphasised in Criterion v(c) - the need to include normal parties of 
government and to exclude anti-system parties. After our earlier dis­




























































































of normal government parties is of even greater importance to the 
fragile governments emerging under Criterion v, since the repercus­
sions of not including them might well be enough to upset the whole 
arrangement. Besides, such parties are often the ones motivated to 
begin negotiations with other parties and to smooth over differences 
between their partners. Their familiarity with administration also 
removes another potential point of friction from an already trouble-prone 
situation.
Even where policy agreements are absent, the minimal winning coali­
tion may not be quite as small as in abstract it might be, owing to the 
need to include established government parties. We shall take this fac­
tor into account when reviewing the success of the criterion in Chapter 2.
The important point to note is the incorporation of the minimal 
winning criterion (realistically modified) in our 'rules' of government 
formation. This takes cognisance of the findings cited in Section 1 on 
the incidence and longer duration of such governments in certain situ­
ations. As the earlier critique stresses, however, the criterion 
becomes relevant only when ideological and policy considerations do not 
provide an alternative basis for the creation of a government. It is a 
procedure of last resort, applied in the absence of other, more satis­
factory, modes of action. While our formulation offers a synthesis with 
earlier theory, it does so on an assumed primacy of policy considerations. 
This also carries over to the other implications considered below.
iii. Outside support of governments
On pure office-seeking criteria, parties which consistently or 
generally support a Government of which they are not part are acting 
with total irrationality. Since they do not share in Ministries or other 




























































































apart from building bridges to the next government. But in office­
seeking theories parties have a short time perspective - as is only 
realistic in politics. If we view the matter from a concern with 
policy, however, there are very good reasons for some excluded parties 
supporting Governments. This is whenever the existing Government, 
however unattractive, offers a better chance of the party's policies 
being put into effect than any of the other likely alternatives. Even 
where the Government's policy is only marginally better from the view­
point of the party, the costs and trouble involved in a governmental 
crisis may well induce it to maintain support at crucial junctures.
This point is spelled out in Implication l(iii) of Table 1.3 
(which summarises other applications of the assumptions). It is a
(Table 1.3 about here)
difficult proposition to test since it carries the danger of circularity 
- immediately an outside party supports a government this might be taken 
as proof that it must see the alternatives as worse. However the 
implication need not be circular provided there is direct evidence on 
how party leaders view the situation. And it does fit the real situation 
in which such outside support is often given, where the office-seeking 
hypothesis does not. Chapter 2 deals with some of the operational dif­
ficulties of testing this point.
A particular case of parties offering support without participation 
comes with anti-system parties. These are generally excluded through 
the deliberate reactions of the other parties, inspired by their over­
riding urge to preserve democratic procedures (Implication l(i)). For 
anti-system parties themselves, support will be most clearly called for 
at times when the Socialist programme is salient, as it strongly affects 




























































































with the other parties on their own side of that cleavage, in order to 
maintain a Government of their particular tendance (Implication l(ii)).
iv. Distribution of ministries
Most theories of democratic government confine themselves to the 
party composition of coalitions (taking single-party governments as the 
extreme case of a minimal winning coalition). On office-seeking 
criteria, however, the distribution of ministries is equally or even 
more important, since control of a Ministry is the main reward sought by 
parties for entering Government in the first place. Even on policy 
criteria, control of Ministries is important, because it is the crucial 
element in the formulation and (perhaps more important) the implementa­
tion of programmes in a particular area. All this is simplified in the 
case of a single-party government, of course, since all ministries are 
then at its disposal and the problem of distribution then relates to 
intra-party factions - with which we deal below (Section 2.vi). Most 
of the discussion in this section relates to coalition governments, 
normally of several parties.
The few treatments which have dealt explicitly with the distribution 
of ministries, mostly on an office-seeking basis, have stressed pro­
portionality as the major criterion for allocating offices within a 
coalition. That is, each party expects, and gets, a share of ministries 
more or less equal to the share of legislative votes it contributes to 
Government support. Empirical evidence for this equivalence has been 
produced from a matching of seats and ministries for European cabinet 
coalitions from 1945 to 1970. This produced an almost one to one equi­
valence between shares of seats and shares of ministries (Browne and 
Franklin, 1973). The authors of this study noted that there may also be 




























































































operation, whereby the allocation of 'important' ministries may 
supplement the quantitative norm. The only available evidence on this 
aspect of the distribution - for coalitions in Indian State Governments 
- indicates that larger parties did not necessarily receive the more 
important ministries (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975).
A policy-based approach must put more emphasis than the office­
seeking formulation on parties' concern not just with important mini­
stries, but with ministries in the particular areas of their interest. 
Thus it is not just a question of getting an equivalent return for their 
support in general, but of securing a specific Ministry or Ministries 
because of their significance for the party’s policy concerns.
At the same time proportionality between seats and votes cannot be 
ignored. Precisely because all coalition partners wish to advance their 
own goals so far as possible, they will seek control of as many govern­
ment ministries as they can and thus limit the numbers available to 
other parties. Each party has a sanction in that withdrawal will lessen 
the Government's chances of survival. The most likely division that they 
can agree on will be one which (a) secures each party the Ministry(ies) 
important to it (subject to the constraint that some of these may be of 
equal importance to other parties in the Government, so not all 
Ministries of concern may be secured); (b) maintains a rough equivalence
between a party's support in the legislature and the number of Ministries 
it obtains.
This provision in regard to proportionality matches Browne and 
Franklin's findings on European coalition governments. Whereas they 
intepreted this as evidence of a strict proportionality rule based on 
office-seeking, proportionality is regarded here as the second stage in 




























































































The crucial question in deciding between these interpretations is 
whether there is in fact any general connection between specific types 
of party and the types of ministry they obtain. This point is investi­
gated in detail in Chapter 3. Implication 2(ii) in the table forms a 
summary of this argument.
It should, however, also be taken in conjunction with Implication 
2(iii). Not all types of party exist in all countries, although the 
major types of Ministry do. There is no Agrarian party in Britain, 
France or Germany, for example, and no Christian party in either of the 
first two countries. What happens in these cases to Ministries which 
would otherwise have been allocated to the missing party? Its policy 
concerns are likely to be taken up by parties of a similar disposition, 
who seek to occupy the Ministries it would otherwise have wanted to 
secure. For example, since the countryside is the place where tradi­
tional loyalties usually survive longest, one would expect religious 
parties to take up rural interests where a specifically agrarian party 
is absent. This point will be expanded in Chapter 3, through a specifi­
cation of the policy interests of each type of party, and listing of the 
Ministries that are as a result salient to them.
For larger parties with a developed comprehensive ideology, most 
Ministries are relevant. Hence the amount and importance rather than 
the type of Ministry is a prime concern. In this they will conform more 
to Browne and Franklin's rules of quantitative and qualitative pro­
portionality. Not for the first time, office-seeking and policy-pushing 
criteria produce similar predictions here. The most important ministry 
in view of its centrality and dominance of the Government agenda is the 
Premiership. The largest party in the coalition can be expected to 
assert its claims to this, perhaps even being willing to cede otherwise




























































































share in order to get it. The rationale here is that all parties covet 
this central post for its policy advantages: in resulting struggles or 
bargaining, the party with most resources will generally get it and 
this will be the largest party.
These are the major, general findings expected over all coalitions. 
There are the further Implications 2(iv) and 2(v), however, which state 
conditions under which this type of share-out will be less evident. This 
follows from the assumptions that coalition governments differ consider­
ably according to whether they form in response to an anti-democratic 
threat, as appendages to a majority or dominant party, as quasi-majority 
coalitions of a Socialist or Bourgeois tendance, as agreed multi-party 
cabinets in the absence of the preceding conditions, or as minimal winning 
groups unable to agree on current issues. In the case of a Government of 
National Unity, where the overriding imperative is preservation of the 
regime, it would be unreasonable to expect parties to stick out for 
Ministries of their own concern. Somewhat similar considerations apply 
to participation in a tendance majority where the main consideration is 
the victory or defeat of the Socialist programme rather than parties' 
specific policy interests. Where a small party tags along with a majority 
or dominant party it can similarly not expect to get more than basic 
demands - perhaps the one Ministry of most pressing concern (provided 
this is not also desired by the dominant partner). The greatest scope 
for bargaining comes with coalitions of many relatively equal partners.
The general trends mentioned in Table 1.3 should be more evident here - 
and even more among relatively disagreed minimal winning coalitions than 
among coalitions formed on the basis of agreements on current policy.
In the latter case, parties have through the coalition agreement some 
guarantee that preferred policies will be pushed regardless of the parti­
cular ministries they control. Where agreement has proved impossible, 




























































































through control of particular ministries. Hence there should be an 
additional premium on occupying those of major concern to each partner.
v. Policies pursued by Governments
All these points will be covered in detail in Chapter 3. The dis­
cussion now turns to related questions of policy-making. In a policy- 
based approach this is central: far from Governments adjusting policy 
in order to gain office, its implementation is the major reason for 
parties taking office in the first place.
Since it is so central, the question has been thoroughly discussed 
already. So the way in which implications follow from assumptions is 
obvious. Governments will give first priority to support of democracy 
where it is endangered (3(i)). Where Socialist-Bourgeois tensions are 
high, Governments will be mostly concerned with the points at issue 
between them, typically the distribution of income and other resources 
and extension of government intervention (3(ii)). And where neither 
consideration prevails, parties will be concerned with their own 
characteristic policies (3(iii)). We do not rely on the sketchy charac­
terisation of these made in Table 1.3 but spell out the connections 
between parties and their preferred policies, with supporting argument, 
in Chapter 4.
Generally the office-seeking explanation has neglected questions of 
policy-making. The only answer it has provided to the question of what 
Governments actually do when in office derives from the related theory 
of party competition: parties in government adjust policies to the 
preferences of the majority of electors so as to gain more votes in the 
next election. This is not a very clear or specific answer, however.
There may be no clear majority. Moreover, in a coalition each constituent 





























































































multi-party system electors' opinions diverge widely. Where parties 
seek to enhance their reputation by acting reliably and responsibly this 
involves fulfilment of election pledges. Since these are the parties' 
declared policies the general office-seeking theory of party competition 
(but not its spatial formulation (cf. Budge and Farlie, 1977, chs.3-5)) 
becomes equivalent at this point to the policy-making one: both concur 
on the assertion that parties in office will pursue their characteristic 
policies. Nevertheless the policy-making formulation arrives at this 
implication by a more direct route, and is to be preferred (if the impli­
cation is upheld in comparison with the evidence) on grounds of theoreti­
cal parsimony and clarity.
The other body of investigation which bears on government (as 
distinct from administrative) policy-making is that related to the 'out­
puts' of government. This has generally concentrated on relating social 
and political characteristics of governmental units (class and occupa­
tional distribution, tax base, percentage votes for parties, etc.) to 
expenditures of Government in various areas. The main finding from this 
line of research has been the influence of social and demographic fac­
tors as compared to the relative unimportance of party control or elec­
toral strength. The main thrust of 'output' research thus challenges 
the implications of the 'policy-making' theory that party control makes 
a considerable difference to what governments do.
Recently, however, the thesis has been challenged for mixing such 
disparate governmental units at varying levels of development that 
socioeconomic factors are bound to predominate. Where a country com­
pletely lacks resources, it cannot, obviously, finance a welfare pro­
gramme. Where comparisons are based on units at broadly comparable 
levels of development, political differences - particularly the electoral




























































































the output literature and findings which show the overriding influence 
of party, see Castles (ed.), 1982.)
This finding is, of course, congenial to the thesis argued here.
The various views will be contrasted with evidence in Chapter 4.
Included among the countries under examination are governments like those 
of India and Sri Lanka which are at a lower level of development than 
the others. Nevertheless the analysis should escape the criticism of 
comparing unlike cases since it does not compare expenditure levels and 
other policies between countries with different party governments, but 
rather the performance of different types of Government within the same 
country. Indian Governments in comparison with Western may be able to 
spend very little, but a Congress government should do different things 
from a non-Congress coalition.
vi. Turnover of personnel
Not only does the office-seeking formulation neglect policy consid­
erations, it completely ignores internal change within Governments. Yet 
this is of great significance to their life and behaviour and any 
explanation seeking to be comprehensive must cover it.
The first implication (4(i)) follows directly from Assumption 7 in 
Table 1.1. Both incorporate the trivial but necessary point that the 
departure of a Minister usually involves replacing him (rather than 
abolishing the Ministry). He may be succeeded by a person from outside 
the current administration, but more usually by somebody from inside, 
who has to be replaced in turn. Thus the resignation of a single member 
usually produces repercussions which go beyond his particular post.
Unless a major change had been impending, however, this type of event 
will not involve extensive transfers and turnover of personnel. Where




























































































existing arrangements more than is absolutely necessary, and so the 
extent of change will be limited. On the other hand, given that senior 
politicians tend to be elderly, such enforced resignations are quite 
frequent and need to be explicitly noted as producing change extraneous 
to the main line of the other arguments.
These are taken up forcefully again in the second implication 
(4(ii)), which relates the extent of internal change and reshuffles to 
the power of the Prime Minister. We have already noted (Assumption 5, 
Table 1.1) that factions with distinct policy preferences will exist 
within most parties. Internally they will act in relation to each other 
just as externally parties do in relation to each other. That is, they 
will seek control of certain ministries within the overall party share, 
and try to advance their preferences by implementing them within mini­
stries and seeking to influence overall party actions. Since factions 
will, by and large, agree more with other factions within the same party 
than with factions outside, overall unity will be preserved by an ability 
to negotiate compromises and by procedures for party unity and discipline 
which are explicitly designed to prevent disputes from getting out of 
hand. Nevertheless internal struggles, even though muted, may be 
expected to go on. Where there is a single-party government these will 
be the main source of government dissensions. In a coalition, of course, 
dissensions between parties overshadow internal factional jockeying and 
also put more of a premium on party unity.
By Assumption 6 in Table 1.1, we assume that the Prime Minister, 
like other members of the party, is a member of a faction committed to 
forwarding its policy emphases. He will advance these in part through 
his agenda-setting and related powers. To exert these he has, of course,
to retain office and more immediately to prevent the emergence of




























































































obvious way to buttress his position and that of his faction is to 
move rivals fairly frequently, to prevent them consolidating a power base 
inside their own Ministry.
Quite apart from helping his own faction, the Prime Minister has 
also to enhance the effectiveness and unity of the overall party so far 
as he can. This involves fairly prompt action to replace inefficient 
and unpopular Ministers by better nominees.
These considerations apply mainly to single or predominant-party 
governments. In coalitions the Prime Minister's power is limited by the 
necessity of getting other partners’ agreement to the replacement of 
their Ministerial nominees. Unilateral attempts at replacement are 
liable to provoke a government crisis. Because of the difficulty of 
replacing Ministers once a coalition agreement has been hammered out, 
internal change should be much less in the case of coalitions compared 
to single-party or predominant-party governments. Again, of course, 
one has to recognise the varying situations under which coalitions come 
into existence. Where an overriding sense of purpose binds the coali­
tion together, as in the case of anti-democratic threats or Socialist- 
Bourgeois confrontation, partners are probably disposed to accept 
changes for the sake of maintaining unity. Where the coalition is simply 
a convenient tactical adaptation to the circumstancejof the moment, 
change is more likely to result in crisis.
The incidence of reshuffles and replacements can then be related 
to restrictions on Prime Ministerial power, which are least in single 
and predominant-party governments and greatest in minimal winning coali­
tions without policy agreements. Factions within a party may, of course, 
be stronger or weaker, and to the extent that other factions are




























































































constrained by institutional structures or constitutional conventions 
giving more autonomy to other Ministries, although this is not likely 
to be the case in the Parliamentary regimes with which we are concerned.
vii. Dissolution of Governments
As noted, attempts by the Prime Minister to replace Ministers in 
a coalition government may cause the breakdown of a coalition govern­
ment, especially one composed of relatively equal partners and formed on 
the basis of ad hoc agreements, or even without these. This is recog­
nised in Implication 5(v) of the table. Since each party has joined to 
advance its own policies as effectively as possible, a major threat to 
these - either in the shape of a direct attack or in the loosening of 
its control over a Ministry - will cause withdrawal. This is also likely 
where a party sees its future policy effectiveness impaired by continuing 
participation in the Government (Implication 5(vi)). Both reactions are 
again more likely in tactical coalitions than in Governments of National 
Unity or in those based on Socialist or Bourgeous tendances.
In coalitions all parties hold an initiative in regard to the life 
of the Government, In single-party governments such decisions rest 
mainly with the Prime Minister. As the representative of a particular 
policy line, he is likely to resign (or dissolve Government and Parlia­
ment if he has the power) if defeated on what he regards as a major 
point. If such a defeat occurs, the usual mechanisms for ensuring party 
discipline and unity have broken down and resignation forms the most 
attractive alternative. By this he may ensure an eventual triumphant 
return if he proves indispensable, or at least be able to mount a tough 
campaign for his alternative from outside Government. These considera­
tions also apply in a coalition government where the Prime Minister is





























































































In his role as party leader, the Prime Minister will also be con­
cerned with long-term effectiveness and hence with electoral advantages. 
If he has the power of dissolution in his own hands, the point at which 
he chooses to exercise it will certainly be the most electorally advan­
tageous for his own party when it stands a good chance of increasing its 
vote share (or attaining a majority of seats in competitive two-party 
systems). This should be at a point when the positive aspects of the 
party and government record outweigh the negative (Implication 5(iii)). 
Alternatively he may choose a time which will minimise his party's likely 
loss of votes.
Like all the other types of Government behaviour discussed above, 
termination and dissolution can thus be seen as reflecting party and 
factional concerns with policy. Where prospects for advancing declared 
preferences radically diminish, support for government continuance 
declines. Where continuance seems less fruitful for advancing prefer­
ences in the long run than dissolution, then the latter is adopted as a 
better strategy. This implies a bolder risk-taking approach to parti­
cipation than would be implied by the office-seeking hypothesis, where 
selfish maximisers would be inclined to hold on to the last moment to 
enhance their gains from office.
All the implications discussed (5(iii) - 5(iv)) relate principally 
to periods when there is no overpowering reason for government unity.
They are expected to apply where there is no threat to the regime nor 
confrontation of Socialist and Bourgeois tendances. In a modified form 
they may operate in the latter case. Additional reasons for government 
termination will, however, follow from the ending of the circumstances 
which have provided cement to hold a coalition together - the quietening 
of Socialist-Bourgeois tensions and the withdrawal of threatj,to the 






























































































The three summary tables ta-ioouoo□ d =ah&ve provide a comprehensive, 
comparative theory of democratic government which integrates the various 
aspects of party behaviour at that level of politics. It is comprehen­
sive because it can be applied to all the major aspects of Governments' 
existence - how they form and change, what they do, how they end. It 
is comparative because it applies to all types of Government formed by 
elected parties - single party, dominant party, or coalitions of various 
types. Hence it can be applied to all democracies, not just to Anglo- 
Saxon, Scandinavian, Southern European or Third World. These are shown 
to differ because of specific divergences in the results of elections.
This theory is more extensive than existing formulations. It is 
also more plausible than office-seeking theories. Politicians may be 
out for themselves some of the time (and some politicians all the time!). 
But they also make stands of principle and have declared policies dis­
tinct from those of other parties to which they publicly commit them­
selves. If politicians merely wanted office, Governments should be 
markedly stable once an initial division of offices was agreed. We know, 
however, that this is not so: they often fall apart over policy dis­
agreements, while even within a single-party Government factions emerge 
which are distinguished primarily on policies.
The policy commitment hypothesis also seems to fit existing evi­
dence better than office-seeking, since it is compatible with all the 
types of government which actually form. The rest of the book is devoted 
to checking the fit further, by elaborating the implications of the 
explanation and checking these in detail against evidence from the 
twenty-one democracies. Chapter 2 examines the question of government 
formation; Chapter 3 the allocation of ministries; Chapter 4 policy­




























































































an overall evaluation of results and discusses the particular modifica­
tions that they entail.
The development of this discussion follows the actual stages in 
which the project was conceived, starting from an a priori theory of 
Government formation, extending its implications to other aspects of 
party behaviour in Government, and then collecting and analysing infor­
mation to check these. As the data were collected after developing the 
theory, its fit with subsequent findings should validate it more 





























































































General Assumptions of an Integrated Theory of Democratic Party Government
1. In parliamentary democracies the party or combination of parties 
which gains a majority on legislative votes of confidence forms the 
government.
2. Parties seek to form that government with a majority on legisla­
tive votes of confidence which will most effectively carry through 
their declared policy preferences under existing conditions.
3. (a) The chief preference of all democratic parties is to counter
threats to the democratic system.
(b) Where no such threats exist, and Socialist-Bourgeois differ­
ences separate the parties over salient current issues, the 
preference of all parties is to carry through policies related 
to these differences.
(c) Where neither of the preceding conditions hold, parties pursue 
their own group-related preferences.
4. Normal governmental arrangements are most effective in getting 
policies carried through. Subject to their declared policies 
being advanced, therefore, parties seek to form governments with a 
party composition as close to the normal as possible.
5. Within parties, and subject to overall policy agreements and 
disciplinary and procedural constraints, factions seek to transform 
their own policy preferences into Government policy most effectively.
6. With the exception of essentially caretaker administrations, 
Government ministers, including the Prime Minister, are members of 
parties; and within them, of factions.






























































































Hierarchical Criteria for Government Formation 
Implied by Assumptions 1-4 of Table 1.1
Criterion i Where the democratic system is immediately threatened
(externally or internally) all significant pro-system 
parties will join the government excluding anti-system 
parties.
In the absence of immediate threats to democracy:
Criterion ii(a) Any party with an absolute majority of legislative 
votes will form a single-party government;
Criterion ii(b) except where such majorities are unusual, where it will 
form the dominant party of a government excluding anti­
system parties.
Where no party has a majority of votes and Socialist- 
Bourgeois differences over current issues are salient:
Criterion iii the tendance with the majority will form a government 
either including or with support from all numerically 
significant parties in the tendance (anti-system parties 
can only provide support and are excluded from partici­
pating in government).
If no such Socialist-Bourgeois differences exist the 
party which:
Criterion iv(a) is largest and has a near-majority of votes 
or
Criterion iv(b) is manifestly larger than any other pro-system party 
will either form the government alone in countries 
where single-party government is normal, or will form 






























































































Where Socialist-Bourgeois differences are not salient 
and no single party has sufficient votes to meet 
Criteria ii or iv, coalitions with a plurality will be 
formed:
Criterion v(a) to group the parties most agreed on the specific issues 
currently salient;
Criterion v(b) failing such agreement to minimise the numbers of parties 
in government to those which will provide a majority on 
legislative votes of confidence;
Criterion v(c) in any case, to include the normal parties of government 































































































Major Implications of the General Assumptions of Table 1.1 for Other
Parties' Support of Government from Outside, for the Distribution of
Ministries, for Policy-Making, and for Dissolution of Governments
1. Support of Government rather than participation
(i) A party regarded as anti-system cannot because of the opposition
of other parties participate in Government, and can only support and 
not join Governments which will pursue some of its preferred 
policies (Assumptions 1-4).
(ii) Where threats to democracy are absent but Socialist-Bourgeois 
differences are salient, anti-system parties will support parties 
of their own tendance from outside Government (Assumptions 1-3).
(iii) A party which cannot persuade others to form a Government which 
will put into effect any of its characteristic policies, will not 
join the Government which is formed, but will vote for/abstain in 
favour of that Government if it considers all practicable outcomes 
(including an election) would further reduce the possibility of 
putting its policies into effect (Assumptions 1-3).
2. Distribution of Government Ministries between parties in a coalition
(i) The largest party in a coalition will take the Premiership 
(Assumptions 1, 2, 3(c)).
(ii) Subject to rough overall proportionality, each party will seek 
control of Ministries in their own areas of policy concern, e.g. 
Agrarian parties will seek the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Fisheries and Regional Affairs; Labour parties will seek Ministries 
of Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Labour Relations; Conservative 
parties will seek Defence, Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, etc. 
(Assumptions 2, 3(c)).





























































































of the existing parties will seek ministries in its area of policy 
concern (Assumptions 2, 3(c)).
(iv) These tendencies are least evident when governments are formed to 
counter anti-democratic threats and less evident when tendance 
governments are formed in a situation of Socialist-Bourgeois hos­
tility.
(v) A small party in a Government which could be formed by a large 
party on its own will not necessarily get a proportionate share of 
Ministries.
3. Policies pursued by Governments
(i) Where there is a threat to the democratic order, Governments will 
direct their main policies to countering it (Assumptions 1, 2, 3(a)).
(ii) Where there is no such threat but Socialist-Bourgeois differences 
do separate the parties over salient current issues, Governments 
will be chiefly concerned with redistributive policies and Government 
control and intervention (the direction of policy being decided by 
the Socialist/Bourgeois complexion of the Government) (Assumptions
1, 2, 3(b)).
(iii) Each party in the Government will have some of its preferred 
policies put into effect, i.e. Governments including an Agrarian 
party will pursue policies more favourable to farmers and rural 
interests than Governments without an Agrarian party: similarly with 
Labour parties and the working class and Conservative/Liberal 
parties in regard to business, etc. (Assumptions 2, 3(c)).
4. Turnover of personnel
(i) The death/illness/withdrawal of a member of a government always
TABLE 1.3
(continued)




























































































(ii) The turnover of individuals in ministries is greater where the 
Prime Minister has more freedom of action; and declines as the 
Prime Minister has less freedom of action in relation to:-
(a) other ministries
(b) party factions
(c) coalition parties in government
(i.e. where the Prime Minister has greater opportunities he is 
able to move factional opponents to prevent their creation of a 
power base, to take action in event of failure by a minister, to 
conserve general prestige of government, etc.) (Assumptions 1, 2, 
3(c), 5).
5. Dissolution of Governments
(i) When a threat to the democratic order ceases, Governments formed 
to meet it terminate.
(ii) When Socialist-Bourgeois differences cease to be salient, tendance 
Governments formed in relation to them terminate.
Where there is no threat to the democratic order and Socialist-Bourgeois 
differences are not salient:-
(iii) When a Prime Minister can fix the date of an election, he will 
dissolve Government when he feels confident he can improve his 
party's vote share in an election (associated with a good Government 
record) or lessen vote losses (Assumptions 1-3).
(iv) When the Prime Minister is defeated within the Government on a 
major current policy by another party/party faction, he will resign 
and effectively dissolve the Government (Assumptions 2-6).
(v) When disagreement on major current policies or Ministerial replace­
ment provokes withdrawal of support by a coalition party partner,
TABLE 1.3
(continued)






























































































(vi) Where in a coalition government one party has markedly declined
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